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                                         Abstract                                                                      
 
  
 Sports bettors tend to rely on statistical information about an athlete or team’s past performance 
even though this type of information often has no predictive value. The belief that this statistical 
information can help predict future performance is typically held by experts and novices alike. A recent 
study conducted by Cheng and colleagues (in preparation) suggests that sports bettors do not process 
decision outcomes that are based on relevant information in the same way that they process decision 
outcomes based on irrelevant information. Specifically, they found differences in the event-related 
potential component known as Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN), such that FRNs were larger in 
response to outcomes of betting decisions made on information considered to be relevant (i.e., 
predictive) compared to outcomes based on decisions made on information considered to be irrelevant. 
The different levels of expectancies indexed by the FRN occurred regardless of the true predictive 
power of the information guiding the betting decisions. In the present thesis, we tested whether 
previous experience as a fan of a sport would influence the expectations regarding the predictive power 
of statistical information. In three experiments, the FRN amplitudes in response to receiving outcomes 
that resulted from betting decisions made using a well-known hockey statistic (GAA: goals against 
average) were recorded from hockey fans and non-fans. In Experiment 1 participants had a 75% 
probability of receiving the expected win trial when they selected the more favourable team (i.e. lower 
GAA) in a relevant information condition, and the same 75% chance of winning they selected a team 
based on their team name (irrelevant condition). Results showed the effects of information relevance 
among fans only and there were no differences between fans and non-fans in response to outcomes that 
violated expectancy in the relevant condition. In Experiment 2 the probability of winning a bet was set 
to 50% in both the relevant and irrelevant conditions. Results showed that effects of information 
relevance were absent among fans and non-fans, and fans did not show larger FRN amplitudes 
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compared to non-fans in the relevant condition. In Experiment 3 only relevant information was 
presented and participants performed the first part of the experiment with a 75% probability of 
receiving a win when they selected the more favourable team, and a 50% probability in the second half 
of their session. Results showed no differences between fans and non-fans when outcomes violated 
their expectancy when the more favourable team was selected. The P300 component was also 
investigated and generally showed larger amplitudes in response to loss trials when they were less 
frequent (i.e. when the probability of receiving a win was 75%). Overall, the results confirm that the 
perceived relevance of statistic information affects the processing, but that very little experience with 
that statistic is necessary to produce expectancies. 
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  Introduction 
 
 Sports bettors tend to rely heavily on information, such as past performances and home field 
advantage, which they expect to be a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games (Wood, 1992; 
Woodland & Woodland, 2001). Reliance on this information creates an expectancy about statistical 
information and this expectancy seems to be held by individuals in general regardless of their exposure 
and experience level with sports betting (Wood 1992; Woodland & Woodland, 2001). Although 
statistical information has been shown to be useful in increasing winning opportunities above chance 
level (Rogers, 1998) in some cases, it has also been shown that it is not useful in some other cases. For 
example, home hockey teams win approximately 50% of the time (Woodland & Woodland, 2001), and 
bets placed on horseracing using certain statistical information do not yield better outcomes than 
chance (Ladouceur, Giroux, & Jacques, 1998). Furthermore, Woodland and Woodland (2001) have 
also shown that individuals show a tendency to bet on ‘favourites’ rather than ‘underdogs’, despite the 
fact that the profitability opportunities are no higher when betting on favourites. Due to this 
expectancy, sport statistics can be interpreted as relevant information when making decisions, while 
any type of non-statistical information can be perceived as irrelevant when making decisions, as it does 
not create an expectancy.  
 
 
 Sports bettors have been shown to take into account a wide range of relevant and irrelevant 
information when making sports bets (York, 2002). It has also been shown that the more information 
(relevant or irrelevant) they take into account, the more confident they are about their decisions 
(Lamarache, 1988), despite the finding that this does not result in improved outcomes (Allcock, 1987). 
However, sports bettors do not seem to process decision outcomes that are based on relevant 
information in the same way that they process decision outcomes that are based on irrelevant 
information (Cheng et al., in preparation). Through their investigation of the event-related potentials 
 7 
(ERPs) related to processing decision outcomes, Cheng and colleagues found differences in FRN and 
P300 in response to decisions that were based on relevant information, compared to those that were 
based on irrelevant information. Their results suggest that, despite the fact that sports bettors might 
make use of a wide range of information, relevant information creates a stronger expectancy for the 
outcome of a decision, thus resulting in a larger electrophysiological response when the expected 
outcome does not occur. On the other hand, information that is perceived to be irrelevant leads to a 
weaker expectancy for the outcome of a decision, thus resulting in a smaller electrophysiological 
response when the expected outcome does not occur. 
 
 The question addressed in this thesis is whether sports bettors who have formed expectancies 
about how particular statistics relate to performance outcomes process bet outcomes differently than 
sports bettors who do not possess these expectations. The main goal of this thesis is to investigate 
possible differences in electrophysiological responses between sports bettors with knowledge and 
experience with particular pieces of relevant and irrelevant sports related information, compared to 
sports bettors without this knowledge and experience. Some of information that sports bettors use are 
statistical for example, horse lifetime winning percentage (Cheng et al., in preparation) and some are 
non-statistical for example home-field advantage (Woodland & Woodland, 2001). Research 
investigating the differences in performance between sports bettors with knowledge and experience 
with the sports and bettors with no such experience has yielded mixed results. For instance, Rogers 
(1998) has shown that knowledgeable sports bettors outperform novice individuals, while other 
researchers have shown no significant differences between the two populations (Anderson, Edman & 
Ekman, 2005; Ladouceur et al., 1998). The question remains as to whether sports bettors with 
knowledge and experience with the sports differ in the way they process information related to a 
specific sport compared to novice sports bettors. To our knowledge, there is no study in the literature 
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that explores this question by investigating the electrophysiological responses that are related to 
decision making; namely the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P300.  
 
 
The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN). 
 
 Accumulating research has shown that the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) plays a significant 
role in the evaluation of decision outcomes, which has led to the suggestion that the ACC functions as a 
performance monitoring centre (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Miltner, Braun & Coles, 1997; Oliviera, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007). This suggestion is based on 
the finding that unexpected outcomes elicit an ERP component, called the FRN (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Miltner et al., 1997), and source localization has linked the generation of this component to the 
ACC (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN shows a maximal peak around 250 ms 
after the presentation of feedback (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  
  
 Earlier studies have concluded that the FRN is elicited in response to unfavourable (negative) 
outcomes only (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 
1997; Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2003). These results led to the suggestion that the activity of the 
ACC functions as a reward-prediction system that signals an error when outcomes are worse than 
expected (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; 
Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2003). However, later studies challenged those conclusions, and argued 
that the manipulation of positive and negative outcomes in those earlier studies biased the results 
(Kobza & Bellebaum, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2007). Specifically, only negative feedback constituted a 
deviation from participants' expectancies, while positive feedback was expected to be obtained on the 
majority of trials. The later studies employed paradigms where positive and negative feedback could 
 9 
constitute a deviation from expectancy on a number of trials, and results showed larger FRN in 
response to both kinds of feedback as long as they deviated from participants' expectancies. Supporting 
evidence from functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies (Walton et al., 2004) and 
single-cell recordings (Williams, Bush, Rauch, Cosgrove, & Eskandar, 2004) have shown activity in 
the ACC following positive outcomes that deviate from individuals' expectancies; adding to the 
argument that the ACC monitors positive as well negative outcomes (Oliveira et al., 2007). The results 
of the later studies are taken to indicate that activity in the ACC, as indexed by the FRN, reflects a 
system that compares decision outcomes to an expectancy instead of a strictly reward versus non-
reward system (Itagaki & Katayama, 2008; Kobza & Bellebaum, 2013; Luu & Pederson, 2004; 
Oliveira et al., 2007). This is referred to as the expectancy-deviation hypothesis (Oliveira et al., 2007).  
 
Effects of Expectancies on the FRN 
 
 To demonstrate the effects of expectancies on the FRN, Pfabigan and colleagues (2011) trained 
participants with cues that were associated with specific win and loss percentages for a number of 
trials. Following the training period, the win and loss percentages were changed and the modulations of 
the FRN amplitudes as a result of these changes were observed. Initially, cue “1” was associated with 
100% gain, cue “2” with 75% gain, and cue “3” with 100% loss. Afterwards, the percentages 
associated with cue “1” and cue “3” were changed, such that participants received 75% gain when cue 
“1” was presented (instead of 100% during the training trials), and 75% loss when cue “3” was 
presented (instead of 100% during training). The percentages associated with cue “2” remained the 
same, which served as the control condition. The researchers compared the differences in FRN 
amplitudes across the two periods for cues “1” and “3,” with the difference in FRN amplitudes across 
the two periods for cue “2”. Results showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials, regardless 
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of whether the percentages were changed or not; this finding was consistent with previous studies that 
showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to loss outcomes in general (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). More importantly, FRN amplitudes 
were even larger when participants received a loss when cue”1” was presented which was an 
unexpected outcome. Participants also showed larger FRN amplitudes when they received a win when 
cue “3” was presented, once again this was an unexpected outcome based on their initial exposure with 
cue. These results were taken to show that, as a result of exposure to the cues and their associated 
win/loss percentages, participants formed expectancies about these cues and their associated outcomes. 
Thus, outcomes that deviated from these expectancies elicited larger FRN amplitudes. It has been 
argued that the larger FRN amplitudes observed in response to loss outcomes can be taken as 
supporting evidence for the expectancy-deviation hypothesis. Oliveira and colleagues (2007) have 
shown that participants tend to be “overoptimistic” with their predictions about their own task 
performance. This causes them to expect to receive more positive than negative outcomes, making 
negative outcomes deviate even more from their expectancy. 
  
 Moreover, Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham and Cools (2011) were able to demonstrate that 
participants can form and reform expectancies about stimuli within a task. Accordingly, FRN 
amplitudes correspond to deviations from the expectancies held at a specific point throughout the task. 
Chase and colleagues employed a reversal-learning task where participants learned to select one of two 
stimuli to receive a reward on 80% of the trials, and to avoid the other stimulus that resulted in 
punishment on 80% of the trials. The stimulus that was associated with the reward on 80% of the trials 
was alternated throughout the task, and participants had to adjust their selections accordingly. This 
paradigm allowed participants to form an expectancy that one of the two stimuli was the rewarding 
stimulus for a stretch of trials, and when this stimulus was then changed to a punishing stimulus 
(unknown to the participants), it created a deviation from their expectancy. The results of this study 
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indicated that after only a few losing trials, participants were able to quickly detect the change and 
switch to selecting the other stimulus. Importantly, during the losing trials before the participants 
adapted their behavior and switched to the other stimulus, but after the reward-to-punishment change 
occurred, larger FRN amplitudes were elicited relative to the loss trials recorded before the reward-to-
punishment change occurred (i.e. the expected losses). These results suggest that participants were able 
to form and reform expectancies online, and were able to monitor their performance based on these 
expectancies. Based on this research it has been concluded that increases in FRN amplitudes reflect the 
detection of a deviations from an expectancy, which is thought to play an important role in the 
monitoring of one’s performance as well as the signaling of behavioural adjustments when necessary 
(Chase et al., 2011, Hajcak et al., 2005; Oliviera et al., 2007).  
 
   Furthermore, the FRN reflects more than just deviations from one's own expectancies, but a 
more general learning mechanism (Hajcak et al., 2003; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Oliviera et al., 2007), 
whether decisions are made by the individual themselves or others. Larger FRN amplitudes are also 
observed in response to outcomes that deviate from expectancies based on decisions made by others. In 
a study by Yu and Zhou (2006) participants performed a probabilistic learning task where they had to 
learn to respond to stimuli that maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Participants performed 
the task and also observed another participant (confederate) perform the same task in an alternating 
manner. Results showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to outcomes that deviated from the 
participants’ expectancies when they performed the task. But more importantly, larger FRN amplitudes 
were also obtained in response to outcomes that deviated from participants' expectancies when 
decisions were made by others. Learning takes place by monitoring outcomes that are the result of 
one’s own decisions (Hajcak et al., 2003; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), but learning can also take place by 
monitoring outcomes that are the result of decisions made by others (von Borries, et al., 2013; Yu & 
Zhou, 2006).   
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P300 
 The P300 is an ERP component that is widely investigated along with the FRN in studies 
involving decision making. The P300 is a positive deflection with peak latency between 300-600 ms 
post stimulus presentation. Although the P300 is recorded from many electrodes, it has the strongest 
signal over the parietal lobe (Snyder & Hillyard, 1976). It is the most studied ERP component as it is 
elicited by a wide range of cognitive processes related to evaluation and decision making (San Martin, 
2012). It is widely known to be elicited in oddball paradigms, where an infrequent stimulus is 
embedded in a sequence of repeated frequent stimuli. The infrequent stimuli in this paradigm usually 
elicit larger P300 amplitudes than the frequent stimuli, and these effects are found across all modalities 
of stimulus presentation (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977).  
 
 The P300 is thought to reflect a mismatch between the expected representation of a stimulus, 
and the actual representation of that stimulus (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Hajcak et al., 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). This mismatch calls for allocating greater attention resources to the 
infrequent stimulus in order to update the internal representation. This theory has been termed the 
context-update hypothesis (Donchin & Coles, 1988). According to their hypothesis, Donchin and Coles 
suggest that the P300 reflects greater attention to infrequent stimuli in order to update the existing 
mental stimulus-outcome representation and respond effectively to the task at hand. There is support 
for the context-update hypothesis and the role of the P300 in signaling greater attention to infrequent 
stimuli. A study by von Borries and colleagues (2013) provided support for this hypothesis by showing 
P300 amplitude modulation in response to frequent and infrequent stimuli. For a number of trials, 
participants were presented with a few cards, each followed by a particular outcome. The task was to 
indicate what the expected outcome was when presented with a certain card. After a number of trials, a 
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change in the card-outcome pairing was introduced and the cards were now associated with different 
outcomes for another sequence of trials. This card-outcome pairing was manipulated many times 
throughout the experiment. The rationale for this experiment was that the initial sequence will cause the 
participants to form stimulus-outcome representations that they come to expect when they encounter 
the cards. However, when the change is introduced it would create a deviation from the initial stimulus-
outcome representation for the first few trials in the new sequence until the participants incorporate the 
new stimulus-outcome representation and respond accordingly. Results showed larger P300 amplitudes 
for the trials that deviated from participants' expectancies (at the beginning of a new sequence), than 
trials that confirmed participants' expectancies in the initial sequence. Therefore, P300 constitutes an 
important learning tool that helps individuals adjust to stimuli and respond to the task accordingly 
(Donchin & Coles, 1988; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; von Borries et al., 2013).   
 
 
 Some neurophysiological studies have provided further evidence for this close relationship 
between P300 and learning. For example, P300 amplitudes were larger in response to stimuli that were 
encoded and later recalled in a task compared to stimuli that were not recalled (Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 
1987; Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999). There is also evidence for larger P300 amplitudes when 
encoding infrequent stimuli compared to frequent ones in a task, but only if those stimuli were task-
relevant and recalled later in the task (Fabiani, Karis & Donchin, 1986). As for the context-update 
hypothesis, Van Petten and Senkfor (1996) observed that stimuli that do not relate to existing 
expectancies show smaller P300 amplitudes during encoding than stimuli that do relate to existing 
expectancies. These results were taken to suggest that information related to existing expectancies 
needs to be integrated, and therefore larger P300 amplitudes are recorded during the processing of these 
stimuli (Wagner et al., 1999). On the other hand, information that does not relate to existing 
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expectancies does not call for context-updating because they do not violate, nor require incorporation 
into present knowledge and thus elicit smaller P300 amplitudes (Nieuwenhuis, 2011).  
 
P300 and Outcome Valence  
 
 There is debate in the field about whether outcome valence has an effect on P300 and whether 
P300 indexes more than just the context of stimuli (Cohen et al., 2007; San Martin, 2012). Some 
studies have suggested that P300 amplitudes are larger in response to negative outcomes compared to 
positive outcomes (Cohen et al., 2007; Frank et al., 2005). However, these studies have overlooked the 
fact that participants could learn to avoid negative feedback as the experiment progressed, making 
negative feedback less frequent and subjectively less likely to be encountered (San Martin, 2012). 
Other studies have demonstrated the complete opposite trend by showing larger P300 amplitudes in 
response to positive outcomes compared to negative outcomes (Hajcak et al., 2007; Toyomaki & 
Murohashi, 2005), even when positive outcomes were more likely to be encountered (Bellebaum & 
Daum, 2008). While a study by Wu and Zhou (2009) reported larger P300 amplitudes in response to 
positive outcomes compared to negative outcomes only if positive outcomes deviated from participants' 
expectancies. These contrasting results suggest that the effects of outcome valence on P300 may 
interact with more robust mediators, namely stimulus frequency and subjective probability (Horst, 
Johnson, and Donchin, 1980; San Martin, 2012; Nieuwenhuis, 2011). 
 
 
P300 and Subjective Probability 
 
 P300 is thought to be mediated by another important aspect in decision making called 
subjective probability. Subjective probability refers to the perception of the frequency of occurrence of 
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a stimulus as a result of prior experience with the stimulus. This is different from objective probability, 
which refers to the actual frequency of occurrence of the stimulus (Johnson & Donchin, 1980; 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Subjective probability is thought to be independent of objective probability 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2005), which is the overall global frequency, and subjective probability has a larger 
impact on  P300 (Squires et al, 1976; Holm et al., 2006). For example, in the oddball paradigm, target 
stimuli have been shown to elicit larger P300 amplitudes when they were preceded by non-target 
stimuli compared to when they were preceded by target stimuli; despite the same objective probability 
for the target stimulus in both cases (Squires et al, 1976; Holm et al., 2006).  
 
 It has been suggested that P300 reflects the amount of attention necessary to incorporate 
frequencies and adjust to respond to stimuli accordingly (Donchin & Cohen, 1967; Radlo et al., 2001; 
Squires et al., 1977). In the study by Pfabigan and colleagues (2011) described earlier, during the 
practice session participants encountered three different cues that were followed by certain outcomes, 
cue “1” was associated with 100% reward, cue “2” was associated with 75% reward and cue “3” was 
associated with 100% non-reward. During the experimental session the probabilities of reward and non 
reward were changed for cues “1” and “3”, cue “1” was associated with 75% reward and cue “3” with 
75% non-reward, while the probabilities for cue “2” remained the same. The rationale was participants 
would form subjective expectancies of reward in response to cue “1” and subjective expectancies of 
non-reward to cue “3” and subsequent contradicting outcomes would constitute a deviation from their 
expectancy. Results showed that P300 amplitudes were larger after subjectively unexpected outcomes, 
compared to subjectively expected outcomes. These findings are in line with Donchin and Cole's 
Context-updating hypothesis (1988), participants formed specific expectancies about the probability of 
reward associated with specific cues and when these expectancies were violated, greater attentional 
resources were allocated to incorporate this information and update the neural representation of their 
expectancy.  
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The relationship between FRN and P300 
 
 The FRN and the P300 can be thought of as indices of complementary processes aimed to 
detect decision outcomes that deviate from expectancies and lead to behavioural adjustments. The FRN 
reflects outcomes that deviate from individuals’ expectancies, where larger amplitudes indicate that 
outcomes were not in agreement with what was expected (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 
2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN has been shown to function at an implicit 
level as Walsh and Anderson (2011) have shown that instructing participants about reward probabilities 
altered participants’ behavioural choices according to the instructions. However, FRN amplitudes were 
still larger in response to outcomes that deviated from participants’ initial expectancies despite the fact 
that instructions warned them about such deviations. FRN amplitudes eventually adjusted after a few 
trials and deviations from participants’ initial expectancies did not elicit larger amplitudes. Therefore, 
experience with the stimuli is very important for FRN, which suggests that FRN reflects monitoring 
outcomes at an implicit level. As for the P300, it has been shown to reflect the monitoring of outcomes 
at the explicit level. For example, Chase and colleagues (2011) showed that P300 amplitudes were 
larger in response to outcomes that preceded behavioural adjustments, compared to outcomes that did 
not precede such adjustments. Chase and colleagues (2011) also showed that larger FRN amplitudes 
were observed in response to outcomes that deviated from participants’ expectancies but did not 
precede behavioural adjustments. Chase and colleagues (2011) suggested that such results support the 
argument that FRN and P300 are complementary components in the process of optimal decision 
making. However, other evidence suggests that the relationship between FRN and P300 is not that 
predictable and in different contexts, their relationship differs (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; Sallet, 
Camille & Procyk, 2013; Walsh & Anderson, 2011).  
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Information Relevance and its Impact on FRN and P300 
 
  Cheng et al. (in preparation) investigated the differences in the FRN and P300 components in 
response to decisions that were based on relevant information, compared to decisions that were based 
on irrelevant information. Cheng and colleagues hypothesized that outcomes that deviate from 
participants' expectancies would elicit larger FRN amplitudes, compared to outcomes that did not 
deviate from their expectancies, and that this modulation of the FRN would interact with the relevance 
of the information being used to form the expectancy. Specifically, they hypothesized that loss trials 
would elicit larger FRN amplitudes when decisions were based on statistical information (relevant), 
compared to non-statistical information (irrelevant). Relevant information in their study consisted of 
statistical information about the lifetime winning percentages of racetrack horses, while the irrelevant 
information consisted of horses' coat colours. Research has shown that individuals rely heavily on 
statistical information, such as past winning percentages and other statistics to inform their decisions 
when placing bets (Tryfos et al., 1984; Wood 1992; Woodland, & Woodland, 2001). Therefore, 
statistical information is considered to be a relevant piece of information, since individuals have 
expectancy that such information can predict the outcome of a decision. On the other hand, information 
such as horses' coat colours and other non-statistical information are considered irrelevant, since 
individuals do not tend to form an expectancy that these forms of information will predict their decision 
outcomes. These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. 
  
 In Experiment 1, participants viewed information about two horses (A and B) in each trial and 
were instructed to select the horse that they expected to win the race based on the information given. 
There were two conditions: one with relevant information and the other with irrelevant information. In 
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the relevant information condition, the lifetime winning percentages of the horses were presented; for 
example Horse A with a 78% lifetime winning percentage, and Horse B with a 65% lifetime winning 
percentage. In the irrelevant condition, the colours of the horse’s coats were presented; for example 
Horse A is black and Horse B is hazelnut. Immediately after the bet was placed, the participant 
received feedback indicating whether their selection was correct (win feedback), or incorrect (loss 
feedback). In the relevant information condition, participants had a 75% chance of receiving win 
feedback when they selected the horse with the higher lifetime winning percentage. On the other hand, 
in the irrelevant information condition win feedback was predetermined to be received on 75% of the 
trials, regardless of which horse the participant selected. Behavioural results showed that participants 
selected the horse with the higher winning percentage on 90% of the trials, which lead to an average 
winning percentage of 76% in the relevant condition. This was taken as supporting evidence for that 
notion that participants expected that the horse with the higher lifetime winning percentage was going 
to win and that they believed this information was relevant in predicting the outcome of the race.  
 
ERP results indicated that the FRN amplitudes were larger in response to loss trials in both 
information conditions, a general finding regarding the effects of outcome valence on FRN (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002,Hajcak et al., 2005; Miltner et al., 1997; Polizzi et al., 2010). More importantly, loss 
feedback received in the relevant condition when selecting the horse with the higher lifetime winning 
percentage, elicited larger FRN amplitudes than loss feedback received in the irrelevant condition. 
These results were taken to suggest an effect of information relevance on FRN modulation. Cheng and 
colleagues (in preparation) explained that in the relevant condition, participants had the expectancy that 
the horse with the higher lifetime winning percentage would win the race, and when the outcome 
deviated from this expectancy, larger FRN amplitudes were elicited reflecting this mismatch. On the 
other hand, in the irrelevant condition participants did not have an expectancy regarding to the 
relationship between the colour of the horse and the probability of the horse winning the race, thus loss 
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trials did not constitute a deviation from their expectancy. As for the P300, amplitudes were larger 
following infrequent feedback (loss trials) compared to frequent feedback (win trials). These results are 
consistent with previous findings in the literature, suggesting greater attentional resources are allocated 
to infrequent stimuli (Donchin & Coles, 1988, Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).  
  
 According to Hauser and colleagues’ argument (2014), since loss trials were infrequent the 
effects of outcome valence on FRN could have overlapped with the effects of information relevance 
that were observed in Experiment 1. To disentangle this possible overlap, in Experiment 2 the 
frequency of win and loss feedback was equated and the effect of relevance on FRN amplitudes was 
once again investigated. In the relevant condition, participants received win feedback on 50% of the 
trials when they selected the horse with the higher lifetime winning percentage, and a win on 50% of 
the trials in the irrelevant condition regardless of horse colour they selected. Behavioural results 
showed that participants selected the horse with the higher lifetime winning percentage on 66% of the 
trials in the relevant condition, despite the fact that using this strategy only resulted in a win 50% of the 
time. The fact that participants continued to bet on the horse with the higher lifetime winning 
percentage, despite not winning any more than chance, provides support for the theory that individuals 
have an expectancy that using statistical information will optimize their performance. 
 
 Furthermore, the effect of relevance on the FRN amplitudes were demonstrated again as the 
FRN amplitudes elicited by loss feedback were larger when the horse with the higher lifetime winning 
percentage was selected, compared to loss feedback in the irrelevant condition. Therefore, these results 
suggest that the effect of relevance on FRN amplitudes observed in Experiment 1 were not strictly due 
to an overlap between expectancy and valence. Rather, loss feedback when the horse with the higher 
lifetime winning percentage was selected constituted a deviation from the participants’ expectancies, 
compared to the irrelevant condition. However, unlike Experiment 1, which showed larger P300 
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amplitudes in response to loss feedback, Experiment 2 did not show this effect, as P300 amplitudes 
were not different in response to loss feedback compared to win feedback. This was expected as loss 
feedback was as frequent as win feedback and P300 amplitudes show no differences when the stimulus 
frequencies are equated (Campbell et al., 1979).  
 
 To further investigate the effects of relevance that were found in Experiments 1 and 2, Cheng 
and colleagues conducted a third experiment. In the relevant condition, selecting the horse with the 
higher lifetime winning percentage yielded a win on only 25% of the trials, while win feedback in the 
irrelevant condition was set to 25% regardless of which horse colour the participant selected. 
Therefore, the optimal strategy in this experiment was to select the horse with the lower lifetime 
winning percentage, which is contrary to participants' expectancies. Behavioural results showed that 
participants quickly learned to select the horse with lower lifetime winning percentage of trials to 
maximize their wins. Therefore, participants did not make their decisions based on the expectancy they 
initially had about statistical information, but based on the reverse of that expectancy. The results of 
this third experiment showed no effect of information relevance on the FRN amplitudes.  
Cheng and colleagues results suggest that despite the fact that participants learned that selecting the 
horse with the lower lifetime winning percentage was the optimal strategy, their decisions were not 
based on the expectancy they initially had about the statistical information. Their decisions were based 
on overriding their initial expectancies and therefore loss feedback in the relevant condition did not 
constitute a deviation from expectancies. In addition, the effects of outcome valence were still 
observed, larger FRN amplitudes were elicited in response to loss trials compared to win trials in both 
conditions. This adds further support for the notion that the effect of information relevance on FRN 
amplitudes is separate from the effect of outcome valence, since both types of effects were observed 
(Hauser et al., 2014). As for P300, amplitudes were not modulated in response to win and loss feedback 
despite the lower frequency of loss trials. However, Cheng and colleagues (in preparation) argue that 
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could be because participants did not base their decisions on the expectancy they initially had about the 
statistical information. 
 
                                       Current study 
 
  Building on the work reported by Cheng and colleagues (in preparation), the current study 
sought to investigate another possible factor that may influence the FRN component. Cheng and 
colleagues (in preparation) argue that participants come into an experiment with the expectancy that 
certain types of information can strongly predict decision outcomes. Cheng and colleagues also argue 
that because of this expectancy, statistical information is considered to be a relevant piece of 
information, and any outcome that deviates from this expectancy will elicits large FRN amplitudes. 
This expectancy seems to be held by individuals in general whether they have experience with the type 
of statistical information being used or not (Wood, 1992; Woodland & Woodland, 2001).   
 
 One question that arises from Cheng and colleagues results is whether individual differences 
can modulate the FRN component. More specifically, will a group that has knowledge and experience 
in a particular domain show different FRN modulation when performing a task that taps into that 
domain, relative to a group that acquires knowledge about that domain while performing an 
experimental task? We hypothesized that when experts in a domain use their expertise to make a 
decision, they would expect to receive rewarding feedback. Thus, any deviation from this expectancy 
would elicit a large FRN component. On the other hand, when a novice group of individuals use the 
same information to make a decision, their lack of expertise would lead to a weaker expectancy for 
positive feedback. Thus, in this group of novices any deviation from the expectancy would result in a 
relatively smaller FRN. In the group of experts, this deviation from their expectancy would tap into 
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stimulus-outcome representations about their domain of expertise that are already formed through years 
of experience with the domain. While in the novice group that acquires knowledge during the 
experimental session, stimulus-outcome representations should be the result of learning that takes place 
throughout the experiment.  
 
 In order to test the hypothesis that experience within a particular domain may influence how 
individuals process feedback when using knowledge about that domain to make decisions, we choose 
to focus on hockey fans. Specifically, we presented hockey fans and non-fans with a popular statistic in 
hockey referred to as Goals Against Average (GAA), and asked them to use this information to decide 
which of two hockey teams would win a game. GAA represents the average number of goals that a 
team allows into their net over the course of a season. It is a strong predictor of the outcomes of games 
as teams with a lower GAA tend to win more often, and finish on top of the standings. To hockey fans, 
this knowledge has been formed through years of following and learning about the game of hockey. 
This knowledge leads to an expectancy that a team with a low GAA is very likely to beat a team with a 
considerably higher GAA. Non-hockey fans might have a gained expectancy that stats like GAA can be 
predictors of outcomes, but they form a more specific expectancy as they perform a hockey betting 
task. 
 
 A similar two-choice task to the one in Cheng and colleagues (in preparation) was used for this 
study. There were three experiments; the first two experiments differed in their probabilities of winning 
on each trial, and the third experiment included relevant information only. These studies also employed 
the use of two different types of information; relevant and irrelevant as in Cheng and colleagues (in 
preparation). Relevant information in this study consisted of the GAA statistic, whereas the irrelevant 
information consisted of names of European hockey teams. GAA is considered to be relevant 
information since hockey fans and non-fans should perform the task with the expectancy that a team 
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with a low GAA is very likely to beat a team with considerably higher GAA. On the other hand, 
European team names were chosen as irrelevant information since they are related to hockey, yet fans 
and non-fans should not have an expectancy about how these teams will perform. In the current study, 
it was expected that loss feedback in the relevant condition would elicit larger FRN amplitudes 
compared to loss feedback in the irrelevant condition replicating the findings reported by Cheng and 
colleagues (in preparation). More importantly, FRN amplitudes were expected to be larger for fans 
compared to non-fans following loss feedback in the relevant information condition. Fans base their 
decisions on the knowledge and the strong expectancy they have formed about the GAA statistic that is 
the result of following the game of hockey for a long time. Non-fans have a weaker expectancy about 
GAA as they come to form this expectancy by performing the task. As for the P300, it was not 
expected to be modulated by the differences in the strength of the expectancies held by the hockey fans 
and non-hockey fans. However, P300 was expected to be modulated by the probability of each type of 
feedback, where less probable feedback should elicit larger P300 amplitudes compared to more 
probable feedback (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, 2011). 
However, when both types of feedback are equally probable, P300 amplitudes are expected to be 
similar (Campbell et al., 1979).  
 
                                       Experiment 1 
 
It was expected that fans would select the team with the lower GAA on the majority of trials as 
a result of their knowledge of the GAA statistic. The probability of receiving win feedback in this 
experiment was set to 75% if the team with the lower GAA was selected in the relevant condition. 
While the probability of receiving win feedback in the irrelevant condition was predetermined at 75% 
regardless of which team was selected. This manipulation of the probability so that participants 
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received win feedback 75% of the time was implemented to reinforce the expectancy that hockey fans 
have about the GAA, that is it is a strong predictor of the outcomes of games. As for the non-fans, this 
manipulation would teach the non-fans that GAA can be used to as a predictor of the outcomes of 
games.  
 
 For non-fans, it was also expected that they would select the team with lower GAA on the 
majority of trials. Although non-fans were not specifically knowledgeable about the GAA statistic, they 
would be able to logically deduce that a team that has fewer goals scored against them will likely win 
more games. Furthermore, this assumption would quickly be validated, as picking the team with the 
lower GAA would result in win feedback 75% of the time. Based on this validation, we suggest that 
these non-fans would then form an expectancy that teams with lower a GAA would win. Loss feedback 
when the team with lower GAA was selected would thus constitute a deviation from the expectancy for 
both fans and non-fans and was expected to elicit larger FRN amplitudes compared to win feedback, 
similarly to the results reported by Cheng et al. (in preparation). However, it was expected that fans 
would show larger FRN amplitudes in response to loss feedback, since to fans loss feedback was a 
deviation from an expectancy that is based on knowledge and experience with the GAA statistic, 
relative to the non-fans who had newly acquired the information about the GAA statistic. In the 
irrelevant condition, it was expected that loss feedback would elicit larger FRN amplitudes compared 
to win feedback, a general finding in response to loss feedback (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). However, loss feedback in the irrelevant condition was expected 
to elicit smaller FRN amplitudes than loss feedback in the relevant condition. In addition, no 
differences between fans and non-fans were expected in the irrelevant condition. As for P300 
component, larger amplitudes were expected in response to loss feedback since it would be infrequent 
compared to win feedback (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, 
2011). However, no differences were expected due to condition, nor group, for the P300; loss feedback 
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should elicit equally large amplitudes in the relevant condition compared to the irrelevant condition, 
and among fans compared to non-fans. 
 
                                                Method 
 
 Participants performed a decision making task, where on each trial they were shown 
information about two teams and were instructed to select the team they believed would win a hockey 
game. Participants read information on the screen that provided one of two types of information on 
which to base their predictions; relevant or irrelevant information. The relevant information consisted 
of the GAA statistic over the course of the season for each team, whereas the irrelevant information 
consisted of professional European hockey team names. Relevant information and irrelevant 
information were presented in separate blocks; there were two blocks of relevant information and two 
blocks of irrelevant information, for a total of four experimental blocks.  
 
  
Apparatus.  
Electroencephalogram (EEG) data were collected using a 64-electrode Neuroscan Quik-cap 
(Compumedics USA, El Paso, TX). Additional electrodes were placed above, below, and to the side of 
each eye to detect eye blinks and other ocular artifacts. Online data collection was digitized at a 
sampling rate of 250 Hz using Neuroscan Synamps 2 amplifier. EEG recordings and analysis were 
performed using Neuroscan Scan 4.4 software (Compumedics USA, El Paso, TX). Impedances for the 
electrodes were kept below 5 KΩ throughout the experiment. 
 
 26 
Participants.  
Forty right-handed participants (23 females) with normal to corrected-to-normal vision from Wilfrid 
Laurier University’s Psychology Research Experience Program (PREP) participated in exchange for 
course credit. Participants' ages ranged between 18-22 (M = 19.6, SD = 1.92), and there were 21 
hockey fans and 19 non-fans. Data from two participants were excluded due to excessive EEG artifacts, 
therefore, data from 38 participants were included in the analysis (22 females, M = 19.6, SD = 1.92), 
with 19 hockey fans and 19 non-fans. All participants signed a consent form explaining the type of data 
recording that is used in the experiment, potential risks, and other related issues as required by the 
Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. 
 
Procedure and Design.  
After signing the consent form, participants completed a number of questionnaires to assess some 
aspects related to the experiment. First, they completed a Handedness questionnaire (see Appendix A) 
to ensure that they were right-handed. Next, they completed a Hockey Knowledge questionnaire (see 
Appendix B) to assess their knowledge of hockey; this questionnaire was used to determine whether 
participants were hockey fans or non-fans. Afterwards, they completed the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen (SOGS, Lesieur & Blume, 1987) to assess their gambling habits, as gambling habits could have 
an impact on information processing for the current experiment. After the questionnaires were 
completed, the EEG cap was applied in an electrically shielded room, where the experiment took place. 
Participants were seated approximately 70 cm away from a Dell P190SB 19” Flat Panel computer 
monitor, where the instructions and the task were displayed. Participants used a 4-button Neuroscan 
response pad to indicate their responses during the task. Instructions, task trials, and feedback were 
controlled using STIM 2.0 (NeuroScan, Herndon, VA). 
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 In the instructions, participants were informed briefly about the task and their chance of 
winning a $100 Tim Horton's gift card if they earned the highest score (determined by receiving the 
greatest amount of win feedback). Since non-fans did not have a strong understanding of GAA, they 
were given the following brief definition: GAA is the average number of goals a team allows per game 
over the course of a season. Participants were taken through 8 practice trials to familiarize them with 
the task and to demonstrate the effects of eye blinks on data collection. Participants were instructed that 
there were 400 total trials, 200 included information about team GAA spread over two blocks of 100 
games, and 200 included team names spread over two blocks of 100 games. Participants were also told 
that each trial was an actual game that took place within the last few seasons, and that all games were 
selected at random to be included in the task.  
 
 Participants were encouraged to evaluate the information provided in each trial, and to select 
the team they predict had won the game accordingly. In the relevant condition, each trial started with 
an information screen that displayed “Team A” with its GAA underneath and next to it “Team B” with 
its GAA underneath (see Figure 1). After a response was made by pressing button “1” to select “Team 
A”, or button “2” to select “Team B”, a fixation cross appeared for 850 ms, followed by a green cross 
to indicate a win and a red bar to indicate a loss. Both win and loss stimuli remained on the screen for 
1500 ms. In the irrelevant condition, trials followed the same sequence of events, the only difference 
was that the information screen displayed European hockey team names under “Team A” and “Team 
B”, instead of GAA scores (see Figure 1). 
 
 Team's GAAs in the relevant condition were generated according to the range of this statistic 
over the last 10 years in the National Hockey League (NHL), which was found to be between 1.5 and 
3.71. This range was used to constitute the upper and lower limits for this statistic, as the purpose was 
to make participants believe that these statistics were actually derived from real teams and that they 
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were betting on actual games that had taken place. Afterwards, a sequence of 200 unique pairs of 
GAAs that were separated by 1.7 were generated, and each pair was used as the GAA for “Team A” 
and “Team B” in a trial. The purpose of the 1.7 difference in the GAAs was to clearly label one team as 
having a low GAA and the other as having a high GAA, as this difference separates the strong teams 
from the weak ones. This in turn allowed the deviation from expectancy to be clear; for example, if a 
participant predicts the team with the low GAA to win and receives a loss feedback instead, this result 
would be opposite to what they would expect. After the 200 unique pairs were generated, an online 
randomizer (http://www.randomizer.org) was used to randomly assign the pairs in order so that “Team 
A” was the team with the low GAA as often as “Team B” throughout each block. As for the team 
names in the irrelevant condition, they were gathered from a website that lists all the European 
professional hockey teams (http://www.flashscore.com). Two hundred teams were selected from the 
website and 200 unique pairs were created by randomly selecting one team as “Team A” and another as 
“Team B”. 
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Figure 1: Sequence of events in trials 
A) An example of win feedback in the relevant condition and B) an example of loss feedback in the 
irrelevant condition. Each trial started with an information screen that displayed the piece of 
information related to the block type (relevant vs. irrelevant), after a response was made, a fixation 
cross appeared for 850 ms followed by the feedback which remained for 1500 ms. 
 
 The experiment consisted of 400 trials that spread over 4 blocks, two of which included relevant 
information only, and the other two included irrelevant information only. The blocks were presented in 
an alternating manner, and participants always started with a relevant block. Participants were asked to 
make their decisions in a timely manner; however, they were encouraged to take as long of a break as 
needed between blocks. The distribution of win trials in the relevant condition was set up randomly by 
using the online randomizer (http://www.randomizer.org) in a way that 75% of the trials yielded a win 
if the team with the lower GAA was selected. The distribution of win trials in the irrelevant condition 
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was set up using the same online randomizer in a way that 75% of trials yielded a win, regardless of 
participants' selections. 
 The winning percentage in the relevant condition was predetermined such that participants had 
a 75% chance of receiving win feedback on each trial if they selected the team with the lower GAA. In 
the irrelevant condition, the winning percentage was predetermined at 75% regardless of which team 
the participants selected on each trial. The purpose of the winning percentage manipulation was to 
reinforce participants' existing expectancies about the two types of information. Specifically, the 
manipulation was intended to reinforce the fact that team GAA is a relevant piece of information in 
predicting outcomes of games, since participants won on the majority of the trials where the team with 
the lower GAA was selected. While the names of non-popular teams was an irrelevant piece of 
information in predicting outcomes of games, since they randomly selected to yield win or loss trials. 
 
ERP recording and analysis.  
 ERP data were collected using all 64 electrodes, which were referenced offline to the mastoid 
electrodes (M1 and M2). Data were filtered using a band pass of 1 Hz (12 dB/octave) to 30 Hz (24 
dB/octave). Epochs were created from -100 to 600 ms around the feedback stimulus; these epochs were 
then baseline corrected using a 100 ms pre-stimulus period. Finally, trials contaminated with artifacts 
exceeding the threshold of ±50 μV were rejected. 
Amplitude grand averages for the six possible outcomes were created. The relevant condition 
contained four possible outcomes: select low GAA and win (low_win), select low GAA and lose 
(low_lose), select high GAA and win (high_win), and select high GAA and lose (high_lose). The 
irrelevant condition contained only two possible outcomes, since win and loss trials were 
predetermined: irrelevant win (Irr_win) and irrelevant loss (Irr_loss). Since participants rarely selected 
the teams with the high GAA in the relevant condition, the final analyses included two outcomes 
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(low_loss) and (low_win) from the relevant condition and (Irr_win) and (Irr_lose) from the irrelevant 
condition.  
 
 FRN amplitudes were extracted at the central electrode Fz, while P300 amplitudes were 
extracted from the parietal electrode Pz, as these electrodes are where these components have been 
shown to be maximal (Chen, Suo, Yuan & Feng, 2011). FRN peaks were identified as the most 
negative peaks between 200-350 ms after the presentation of the feedback stimulus, while P3 peaks 
were identified as the most positive peaks between 250-600 ms after the presentation of the feedback 
stimulus (Chen et al., 2011). Due to the smaller number of trials in (low_loss) and (Irr_loss), down-
sampling of the trials in some conditions was a necessary step for comparisons of the differences in 
amplitude peaks among the conditions. For each participant, the trials in each condition were randomly 
down-sampled to the number of trials in the condition with the lowest number of trials. Behavioural 
data, which included the frequency of selecting the team with the lower GAA were collected as 
participants performed the task. 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
The extracted peak amplitudes for FRN were subjected to a repeated-measure ANOVA using 
SPSS (version 19.1, IBM Corp.), with hockey expertise (fans vs. non-fans) as a between-subjects 
factor, and the relevance of the information (relevant vs. irrelevant) and outcome (wins vs. losses) as 
within-subjects factors. The extracted P300 amplitudes were also subjected to the same type of analysis 
using the same factors as in the FRN analysis. Behavioural data were measured by determining the 
proportion of times the team with the lower GAA was selected compared to the number of times the 
team with high GAA was selected on each trial in the relevant condition.  
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                                              Results 
 
 
Behavioural results.  
Fans in the relevant information condition selected the team with the lower GAA on 95% and 93% of trials 
in the first and second blocks respectively, which resulted in receiving win trials on 74% of trials in both 
blocks. On the other hand, non-fans selected the team with the lower GAA on 88% of trials in both blocks, 
which resulted in receiving win trials on 72% of trials in both blocks. As for the irrelevant information 
condition, fans and non-fans received win trials on 75% of the trials regardless of their selection. Also, see 
Figure 2 for the number of accepted trials before and after down sampling. 
 
Condition Average number of accepted trials 
after down sampling 
Average number of accepted trials 
before down sampling 
Low-Win 35.2 110.5 
Low-loss 35.2 35.2 
Irr-Win 35.2 107.8 
Irr-Loss 35.2 36.4 
 
Figure 2: Number of accepted trials before and after downsampling in Experiment 1 
 
FRN Amplitudes.  
A 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Relevance: relevant condition vs. Irrelevant condition) X 2 (Outcome: 
wins vs. losses) RM-ANOVA yielded a main effect of relevance on FRN peak amplitudes, F(1,36) = 
11.081, p = .002, indicating that FRN amplitudes were larger in response to relevant information (M= .016, 
SD= .386) compared to irrelevant information (M= 1.256, SD= .597) (See Figures 3 & 4). There was also a 
main effect of outcome valence on FRN amplitudes F(1,36) = 12.637, p = .001, indicating that FRN 
amplitudes were larger in response to loss trials (M= -.372, SD= .637) compared to win trials (M= 1.644, 
SD= .437). An interaction effect between relevance and outcome was not significant F(1,36) = 3.930, p = 
.055. 
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 An interaction between relevance and group was significant F(1,36) = 4.981, p = .032. Follow up 
tests reveal that fans showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to a loss in the relevant condition compared 
to loss in the irrelevant condition F(1,18) = 14.138, p = .001. However, non-fans did not show a significant 
difference between a loss in the relevant condition compared to the irrelevant condition F(1,18) = .664  p =  
.426. No main effect of group was found F(1,36) = 1.271, p = .287. (See Figures 3,4 & 5) 
      
   
 
Figure 3: FRN average peak amplitudes for Experiment 1. 
Bars represent standard error.              
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Figure 4: FRN average waveforms for losses in Experiment 1  
 
          
Figure 5: FRN average waveforms for wins in Experiment 1 
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P300 Amplitudes. 
 
 A 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Relevance: relevant condition vs. Irrelevant condition) X 2 
(Outcome: wins vs. losses) RM-ANOVA yielded a main effect of relevance on P300 peak amplitudes, 
F(1,36) = 41.702, p < .001, indicating that P300 peak amplitudes were larger in response to irrelevant 
information (M= 8.743, SD= .549) compared to relevant information (M= 6.581, SD= .461). There also was 
a main effect of outcome, F(1,36) = 15.503, p < .001, indicating that P300 amplitudes were larger in 
response to loss trials (M= 8.426, SD= .575) compared to win trials (M= 6.897, SD= .451). The interaction 
between relevance and outcome failed to reach significance, F(1,36) = 3.6, p= .07. (See Figures 4 &5). 
  
 The RM-ANOVA also revealed a main effect of group, F(1,36) = 9.503, p = .004, indicating that 
P300 amplitudes were larger for fans (M= 8.956, SD= .698) compared to non-fans (M= 6.076, SD= .650). 
There was an interaction between group and relevance F(1,36) = 5.684, p = .024. Follow up 2(Outcome: 
wins vs losses) X 2 (Relevance: relevant vs. irrelevant) RM-ANOVA was conducted for fans yielded a 
main effect of outcome F(1,14) = 10.53, p = .006, indicating that P300 amplitudes were larger in response 
to loss trials (M= 7.94, SD= .727) compared to win trials (M= 9.96, SD= .913). As for non-fans, there was a 
main effect of relevance F(1,15) = 8.356, p =.011, indicating that P300 amplitudes were larger in response 
to irrelevant information (M= 5.4, SD= .555) compared to relevant information (M= 6.71, SD= .634). (See 
Figure 6,7 & 8) 
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 Figure 6: P300 average peak amplitudes in Experiment 1 
Bars represent standard error.  
 
 
          
 
Figure 7: P300 average waveforms for relevant conditions in Experiment 1  
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 Figure 8: P300 average waveforms for irrelevant conditions in Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                Discussion 
 
 Experiment 1 aimed to replicate the effects of information relevance reported by Cheng and 
colleagues (in preparation), where loss feedback presented after bets made using relevant information 
elicited larger FRN amplitudes than loss feedback presented after bets placed using irrelevant 
information. Based on these previous results, both fans and non-fans were expected to have larger FRN 
amplitudes in response to loss feedback in the relevant condition, compared to the irrelevant condition. 
In addition, fans were expected to have larger FRNs following loss feedback relative to non-fans in the 
relevant information condition. Specifically, when the team with the lower GAA was selected to beat 
the team with the considerably higher GAA and loss feedback was received, fans were expected to 
have larger FRNs than non-fans. As for P300, there were no differences expected between fans and 
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non-fans. However, larger P300 amplitudes were expected in response to the less frequent stimulus, 
which was the loss feedback in both conditions. 
 
 FRN results showed three main findings. First, there was an effect of outcome valence on FRN 
amplitudes regardless of the condition, with larger FRN amplitudes were elicited by loss feedback 
compared to win feedback for both fans and non-fans. Second, there was an effect of information 
relevance that was similar to that observed by Cheng and colleagues (in preparation); however, among 
fans only. Fans showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials in the relevant condition 
compared to the irrelevant in Experiment 1. Third, no support for the hypothesis that fans would show 
larger FRN amplitudes compared to non-fans in response to loss feedback in the relevant condition was 
found. Rather, both fans and non-fans showed similar FRN amplitudes in response to loss feedback in 
the relevant condition. 
 
 Both fans and non-fans showed an effect of outcome valence on FRN amplitudes. Amplitudes 
were larger in response to loss trials compared to win trials regardless of the condition. These effects 
are a common finding in the literature on the FRN component (Cheng et al., in preparation; Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). Some have argued that the FRN 
reflects unfavourable outcomes only (i.e. loss outcomes; Gehrig & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 
2006; Miltner et al., 1997). However, Oliveira et al. (2007) argued that loss outcomes elicit larger FRN 
amplitudes since loss feedback constitutes a deviation from expectancy, because participants’ goal is 
always to maximize their reward. Therefore, larger FRN amplitudes are always elicited in response to 
loss trials since participants’ expectancy is reward on the majority of trials (Oliveira et al., 2007). 
However, Olivera et al. (2007) also demonstrated that larger FRN amplitudes can also be elicited in 
response to win feedback if this feedback deviates from the participants’ expectancy. It was not 
possible to test the hypothesis of Oliviera and colleagues (2007) in Experiment 1 since both fans and 
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non-fans rarely selected the team with the higher GAA. Therefore, it was not possible to test whether 
larger FRN amplitudes were also elicited in response to outcomes that were better than expected. As a 
result, the outcomes being worse than expected is a plausible explanation for why larger FRN 
amplitudes were observed following loss feedback in this experiment (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2006; Miltner et al., 1997). 
 
 In this experiment, it is presumed that both fans and non-fans formed expectancies about the 
ability of the GAA statistic to predict wins in the relevant information condition, and their decisions 
were based on these expectancies. Behavioural results confirmed that both fans and non-fans believed 
that GAA could help predict the winner of the game, as they selected the team with the lower GAA on 
94% and 88% of the trials, respectively. The effect of information relevance on FRN amplitudes 
reported by Cheng and colleagues (in preparation) suggests that decision outcomes which are based on 
relevant information are processed differently than decision outcomes which are based on irrelevant 
information. In the relevant condition, participants made their decisions based on the expectancy that 
the GAA statistic could help them to predict the outcome of a game. In the irrelevant condition, their 
decisions were not made based on relevant information, rather unknown European team names, thus 
they would not have as great of an expectancy that they would win their bet. Therefore, loss feedback 
in the relevant condition constituted a deviation from their expectancy, compared to the irrelevant 
condition, and thus larger FRN amplitudes were elicited in the relevant condition.  
 
 Fans showed the effect of information relevance, as FRN amplitudes were larger in response to 
loss trials in the relevant condition compared to the irrelevant. However, non-fans did not show the 
effects of information relevance, as FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials in the relevant condition 
were not different compared to the irrelevant. When both fans and non-fans selected the team with the 
lower GAA and received a loss trial, larger FRN amplitudes were expected as a reflection of deviation 
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from expectancy (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Kobza & 
Bellebaum, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2007; Miltner et al., 1997). Therefore, loss trials in this condition 
were expected to elicit smaller FRN amplitudes compared to loss trials in the relevant condition (Cheng 
et al., in preparation). In the irrelevant condition, both fans and non-fans did not make their decisions 
based on an expectancy and large FRN amplitudes were not expected. Unknown team names were not 
expected to help predict outcomes, as was confirmed after the experiment.  
 
One possible explanation for the contradicting finding of equally large FRN amplitudes among 
non-fans in response to loss feedback in both conditions is the 75% probability of receiving win 
feedback in both conditions. The majority of the non-fans mentioned that they attempted to find 
patterns and strategies, such as selecting the team that appeared to be from countries where hockey is 
known to be a popular game. Although there were no such patterns, as win and loss feedback was 
randomly predetermined, the 75% win probability might have contributed to false expectancies of such 
patterns. That in turn, could have contributed to a partial or weak expectancy about these teams among 
non-fans, and thus loss feedback would have constituted a deviation from this weak expectancy as 
reflected by the larger FRN amplitudes. Fans, on the other hand, mentioned that from the beginning of 
the experiment they had no expectancies about these teams as they understood it is impossible to 
predict patterns or strategies about the teams that they are unfamiliar with and their decisions were 
made at random. 
 
We hypothesized that this experiment would demonstrate that hockey fans, as a result of their 
knowledge and experience with the GAA statistic, would elicit a larger FRN following loss feedback, 
relative to hockey fans that were only familiarized with the statistic at the beginning of the experiment. 
However, we did not find that fans demonstrated larger FRN amplitudes to loss feedback in the 
relevant information condition, compared to non-fans. Both fans and non-fans showed equally large 
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FRN amplitudes in response to loss feedback in the relevant condition. Larger FRN amplitudes among 
fans were expected since fans would have come into the experiment with an expectancy that a team 
with a lower GAA was very likely to beat a team with a considerably higher GAA. This expectancy is 
the result of following the game of hockey for years and experiencing such results. Therefore, if they 
selected a team with a lower GAA and received loss feedback, this outcome would have constituted a 
deviation from their expectancy and would be reflected by larger FRN amplitudes (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Kobza & Bellebaum, 2013; Oliveira et 
al., 2007; Miltner et al., 1997). Non-fans on the other hand were given a definition of the GAA statistic, 
and it is likely that they could deduce that teams with a lower GAA would win more often, but since 
they had no previous experience with this statistic, it was presumed that they would form a weaker 
expectancy of its ability to predict the outcome of a hockey game. However, selecting the team with the 
lower GAA was rewarded on 75% of the trials, which would have reinforced this weak expectancy. 
Therefore, if they selected the team with the lower GAA and received loss feedback, this outcome 
would have also constituted a deviation from their expectancy and would have been reflected through 
larger FRN amplitudes. However, it was expected that fans would show larger FRN amplitudes since 
this outcome is a deviation from their long-held expectancy compared to a deviation from an 
expectancy that was reinforced among non-fans as they performed the experiment.  
 
 As for the P300, the results of this first experiment provided support for the hypothesis that loss 
feedback would elicit larger amplitudes compared to win feedback across both populations. Amplitudes 
were larger in response to the infrequent stimulus (i.e. loss feedback) compared to the frequent stimulus 
(i.e. win feedback) among both fans and non-fans. This finding is very common in studies of P300 
(Cheng et al., in preparation; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, 2011). 
According to Donchin and Cole's Context-update hypothesis (1988), larger P300 amplitudes reflect the 
allocation of greater attentional resources towards infrequent stimuli in order to incorporate this 
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information into an existing internal representations. According to this hypothesis, infrequent stimuli 
elicit greater attention since they signal a mismatch between what is expected to be the outcome on 
most trials, and the actual outcome. In the relevant condition, participants expected to receive a win on 
the majority of trials as a result of their expectancies about GAA. Therefore, both fans and non-fans 
needed to update their internal representations of reward probabilities in response to loss trials in both 
conditions and that was reflected by the larger P300 amplitudes.  
 
Unexpectedly, both fans and non-fans showed larger P300 amplitudes in the irrelevant 
condition compared to the relevant. In light of Donchin and Cole's (1988) context-update hypothesis, 
the results of this experiment show that both fans and non-fans allocated greater attentional resources 
towards irrelevant information and elicited larger P300 amplitudes as a result. This finding was not 
observed in the studies reported by Cheng and colleagues (in preparation) as no effect of information 
relevance on P300 was found. Therefore, under the given probability of receiving a win trial of 75% 
and the type of irrelevant information used in this experiment, FRN and P300 show similar patterns in 
response to outcome valence in fans and non-fans, with larger amplitudes in response to loss trials. 
However, FRN and P300 show dissimilar patterns in response to information relevance among fans, 
with larger FRN amplitudes in response to loses in the relevant information condition, but larger P300 
amplitudes in response to irrelevant information. 
 
 
                                      Experiment 2  
 
 The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to create a stronger deviation from expectancy among 
fans compared to Experiment 1. Experiencing a 25% probability of receiving a loss trial when team 
with the lower GAA was selected in Experiment 1 might not have been perceived as a strong deviation 
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from fans' expectancy about GAA. Fans could have expected that a team with low GAA could possibly 
lose to a team with higher GAA occasionally, while non-fans learned the predictability of the GAA stat 
as they performed the task. Therefore, there were no differences in FRN amplitudes between fans and 
non-fans in the relevant condition because there was no strong deviation from fans' expectancy. In 
addition, it has been argued by Hauser et al. (2014) that it is difficult to separate the effects of outcome 
valence from the effects of violation of expectancy on FRN amplitudes when loss trials are less 
frequent than win trials. To address these two issues, the probability of receiving a win trial was 
decreased to 50% in Experiment 2 when the team with lower GAA was selected. In the irrelevant 
condition, the probability of receiving a win a trial was also set to 50%, which would further reinforce 
the expectancy that the European team names are not a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games. 
Due to this decrease in the probability of receiving a win trial, it was necessary to instruct non-fans 
about the nature of GAA as a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games to create a similar 
expectancy to the one they had in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, non-fans experienced a 75% 
probability of receiving a win trial when the team with the lower GAA was selected, which reinforced 
their expectancy about statistics as a strong predictor of outcomes. Therefore, giving non-fans 
instructions would allow for a more accurate comparison of FRN amplitudes in response to deviations 
from expectancy between fans and non-fans.  
 
Despite the 50% probability of receiving a win trial, it was expected that fans would select the 
team with low GAA on the majority of trials as a result of their long-held expectancy and experience 
with GAA. Non-fans on the other hand, were expected to follow the same trend as a result of their 
general expectancy about statistics (Wood, 1992; Woodland & Woodland, 2001) and the instructions 
they were given before the start of the task. It was expected that fans and non-fans would show effects 
of information relevance, with larger FRN amplitudes in response to relevant information compared to 
irrelevant information. However, it was expected that fans would show even larger FRN amplitudes 
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compared to non-fans in response to a loss trial when the team with the lower GAA was selected. 
Because an outcome like that constitutes a deviation from fan's long-held expectancy about hockey 
compared to non-fans who acquired this expectancy by instructions and performing the task. As for 
P300, since loss trials were as frequent as win trials, no differences in P300 amplitudes were expected 
between win and loss trials (Campbell et al., 1979). No differences in P300 were expected either 
between fans and non-fans since P300 amplitudes were expected to be similar in the relevant compared 
to the irrelevant condition.  
 
                                             Method 
 
Experiment 1 did not yield the expected differences in FRN amplitudes between fans and non-
fans in the relevant condition. The reason could have been that receiving a loss on 25% of trials when 
the low GAA was selected is not a strong enough deviation from fans’ expectancy. It is a reasonable 
possibility that a team with low GAA loses to a team with considerably higher GAA at times, as fans 
explained after the experiment. Therefore, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to create a stronger 
deviation from the expectancy that fans hold in regards to GAA, which is a strong predictor of 
outcomes of games. To achieve that, the probability of receiving a win trial when the team with the low 
GAA was selected was decreased to 50%. This was also done to try to replicate the effects of relevance 
when win probabilities were set to 50% in Cheng et al. (in preparation). Cheng and colleagues (in 
preparation) found that when winning probabilities were set to 50%, participants showed the effects of 
relevance on FRN, such that there were larger FRN amplitudes in response to a loss in the relevant 
condition compared to the irrelevant condition.  
 
 45 
The decrease from 75% to 50% probability was necessary, as it has been argued that to separate 
the effects of outcome valence from the effects of expectancy (i.e. relevance), the frequency of win and 
loss trials has to be equated. It was expected that decreasing the probability of winning to 50% in the 
current experiment would yield the effects of relevance that were observed in Cheng et al. (in 
preparation); it was also expected that the probability decrease will also elicit larger FRN amplitudes 
among fans than among non-fans in response to a loss trial in the relevant condition. In Experiment 1, 
non-fans formed an expectancy about GAA as a strong predictor of outcomes of games by receiving a 
win trial 75% of the time. In Experiment 2, however, the 50% probability of winning was not high 
enough to reinforce an expectancy about GAA, and therefore it was necessary to reinforce that 
expectancy in a different way to allow for an accurate comparison between fans and non-fans. 
Therefore, non-fans in Experiment 2 were given more detailed instructions about the nature of GAA in 
predicting outcomes of games compared to Experiment 1 (see Appendix C). 
 
Apparatus.  
The apparatus for this experiment was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Participants.  
Forty-five right-handed participants (22 females) were recruited from Wilfrid Laurier University's 
PREP system for course credit, as well as from the surrounding community for a monetary 
compensation of $20. Participants' ages ranged between 18-54 (M = 22, SD = 4.5), and there were 21 
hockey fans and 24 non-fans. Data from 11 participants were excluded due to excessive EEG artifacts, 
therefore data from 34 participants was included in the final analysis (18 females, M = 21.5, SD = 4.3), 
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with 17 fans and 17 non-fans. All participants agreed to the terms on the consent form, these terms 
were set up by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. 
 
Procedure and Design.  
The procedure and design were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the winning probabilities were 
set to 50% instead of 75%. This manipulation was set up in a way that participants had a 50% 
probability of receiving a win in the relevant condition if they selected the team with the lower GAA. 
While in the irrelevant condition, participants had a 50% probability of receiving a win, regardless of 
which team they selected. The other change from Experiment 1 was that non-fans were given 
instructions prior to the start of the task about the GAA and how it is used as a factor in predicting 
outcomes of games. 
 
ERP recording and analysis.  
This was identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
There was one extra factor compared to Experiment 1, which was the addition of the block factor, such 
that the first block in each condition was compared to the second. Since the probability of winning was 
at 75% in Experiment 1, there were not enough loss trials in the relevant and the irrelevant conditions 
to include a block factor in the analysis. In Experiment 2, however, the probability of winning was set 
to 50%, which yielded a sufficient number of loss trials to allow for the block factor to be included in 
the analysis. The block factor allowed us to evaluate the possible effects due to learning as participants 
progressed through the experiment. This can be used to asses potential interaction effects with other 
factors on information processing in fans compared to non-fans. Therefore, the statistical analysis for 
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the FRN amplitudes in Experiment 2 consisted of repeated-measures ANOVA with expertise (fans vs. 
non-fans) as the between-subjects factor, and relevance (relevant vs. irrelevant), outcome (wins vs. 
losses), and block (first block vs. second block) as the within-subjects factors. The analysis for P300 
amplitudes consisted of a repeated-measures ANOVA with the same factors as the ANOVA that was 
performed on the FRN amplitudes. 
 
 
                                              Results  
 
 
Behavioural results. 
 Fans in the first block of the relevant information selected the team with the lower GAA on 75% of trials, 
while in the second block they selected the team with the lower GAA on 67% of trials. On the other hand, 
non-fans in the first block selected the team with the lower GAA on 65% of trials, while in the second block 
they selected the team with the lower GAA on 52% of trials. Also, see Figure 9 for the average number of 
accepted trials before and after down sampling. 
 
Condition Average number of accepted trials 
after down sampling 
Average number of accepted trials 
before down sampling 
Low-Win (Block1)(Block2)           (15.3)(15.3)                (15.3)(16.1)  
Low-loss (Block1)(Block2)           (15.3)(15.3)                (16.1)(15.7) 
Irr-Win (Block1)(Block2)           (15.3)(15.3)                (76.4)(75.2) 
Irr-Loss (Block1)(Block2)           (15.3)(15.3)                (77.1)(75.2) 
 
Figure 9: Number of accepted trials before and after downsampling in Experiment 2 
 
FRN Amplitudes.  
A 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Relevance: relevant condition vs. Irrelevant condition) X 2 (Outcome: 
wins vs. Losses) X 2 (Block: block 1 vs. block 2) RM-ANOVA yielded a main effect of outcome valence 
on FRN amplitudes F(1,31) = 13.854, p = .001, indicating that FRN amplitudes were larger in response to 
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loss trials (M= .952, SD= .587) compared to win trials (M= 2.739, SD= .538). An interaction between 
group, relevance and block was significant F(1,31) = 4.191, p = .049, indicating differences in FRN 
amplitudes between the two groups in response to relevant compared to irrelevant information across the 
two blocks. Additional post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference in FRN amplitudes in 
response to irrelevant information in block 1 compared to block 2 among non-fans F(1,31) = 8.80, p = .031, 
indicating that non-fans show higher FRN peak amplitudes in block 2 (M= 1.708, SD= .739) compared to 
block 1 (M= 2.926, SD= .809) in the irrelevant information condition. No differences were found among 
the other post-hoc comparisons. (See Figures 10,11,12 & 13) 
 
       
 Figure 10: FRN peak amplitudes in block 1 of Experiment 2 
 Bars represent the standard error. 
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 Figure 11: FRN peak amplitudes in block 2 of Experiment 2  
Bars represent the standard error. 
 
           
 
Figure 12: FRN waveforms for loss conditions in block 1 of Experiment 2  
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Figure 13: FRN waveforms for loss condition in block 2 of Experiment 2 
 
P300 Amplitudes.  
As expected, a 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Relevance: relevant condition vs. Irrelevant 
condition) X 2 (Outcome: wins vs. Losses) X 2 (Block: block 1 vs. block2) RM-ANOVA yielded no main 
effect of outcome F (1,37)= .362, p = .552. However, the RM-ANOVA yielded a significant interaction 
between group and block F (1,37)= 10.16, p = .003, indicating that non-fans show higher P300 amplitudes 
in block 2 (M= 8.25, SD= .882) compared to fans in block 2 (M= 7.25, SD= .933). No main effect of group 
F (1,37)= .064, p = .802, or block F (1,37)= 1.48, p = .323 was found. (See Figures 14,15,16 & 17). 
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 Figure 14: P300 average amplitudes in block 1 of Experiment 2   
Bars represent the standard error.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: P300 average amplitudes in block 2 of Experiment 2 
Bars represent standard error. 
   
 
 Figure 16: P300 average waveforms for relevant wins and losses in block 1 of Experiment 2  
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Figure 17: P300 average waveforms for relevant wins and losses in block 2 of Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         Discussion 
 
 Experiment 2 was designed to further investigate the possible differences in FRN amplitudes 
between fans and non-fans in the relevant condition. Experiment 2 addressed two issues that arose in 
Experiment 1. First, the 25% chance of a team with lower GAA losing to a team with considerably 
higher GAA might not have constituted a strong deviation from fans' expectancy. Therefore, the 
possible differences in FRN were expected to emerge under a stronger deviation from fans’ 
expectancy. Second, in Experiment 1 the effects of information relevance that were found among fans 
could have been due to the fact that losses were less frequent than wins. To separate the effects of 
outcome valence from the effects of information relevance (i.e. deviation from expectancy), loss and 
win trials were equated (Hauser et al., 2014). In Experiment 2 the probability of receiving a win trial 
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when the team with the lower GAA was selected was decreased to 50%. This probability manipulation 
addressed the two issues in Experiment 1 as it constituted a stronger deviation from fans' expectancy 
and to separate the effects of information relevance from the effects of outcome valence.  
 
FRN results showed: first, effects of outcome valence on FRN for both fans and non-fans, 
larger amplitudes in response to loss trials compared to win trials in both conditions and both blocks. 
Second, fans did not show effects of information relevance in either block, no differences in FRN 
amplitudes in the relevant condition compared to the irrelevant. As for non-fans, they did not show 
effects of information relevance in the first block, but they did show them in the second block. 
However, in the second block the effects were in the opposite direction, larger FRN amplitudes in the 
irrelevant condition compared to the relevant. Third, no differences in FRN amplitudes between fans 
and non-fans in the relevant information in either block. 
 
 Both fans and non-fans showed the effects of outcome valence on FRN; loss trials elicited 
larger FRN amplitudes compared to win trials regardless of condition and block. This replicates the 
finding in Experiment 1 despite the equal probabilities of receiving win and loss trials. These effects of 
outcome valence on FRN are demonstrated in a large number of studies involving decision making 
(Cheng et al., in preparation; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 
1997). Despite the equal probability of receiving loss and win trials, loss trials were unfavourable 
outcomes since the participants’ goal was to maximize reward. Although participants received more 
loss trials in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 (25%), loss trials were still unfavourable 
outcomes. Therefore, larger FRN amplitudes in Experiment 2 reflected the unfavourableness of loss 
outcomes independent of reward probability (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Miltner et al., 1997) and relevance of information. 
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 Results for fans in Experiment 2 failed to replicate the effects of information relevance on FRN 
that were found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials in the 
relevant condition were not larger than in response to loss trials in the irrelevant condition in either 
block. In Experiment 1, the effects of information relevance were observed because loss trials in the 
relevant condition constituted a deviation from fans’ expectancy. These effects of information 
relevance were also expected to be observed in Experiment 2, since loss trials in the relevant condition 
constituted even a bigger deviation from expectancy compared to the irrelevant condition. Cheng et al. 
(in preparation) were able to show effects of information relevance when the reward probability was 
decreased from 75% to 50% when the statistically favourable stimulus was selected. However, fans in 
Experiment 2 failed to show these effects despite the fact that they selected the team with the lower 
GAA on the majority of trials. Continuing to select the team with the lower GAA despite the 50% 
chance or reward shows that fans were making their decisions based on their long-held expectancy that 
the team with the lower GAA had a much higher chance to beat the team with the higher GAA.  
 
 Based on the argument by Hauser et al. (2014), to separate the effects of expectancy (i.e. 
information relevance) from the effects of outcome valence, the effects of information relevance need 
to be observed when loss and win outcomes are equated. Cheng et al. (in preparation) were able to 
conclude that the effects of information relevance were separate from the effects of outcome valence. 
That was because Cheng et al. (in preparation) were able to observe both the effects of information 
relevance and outcome valence with 75% and 50% chance of reward. Since the effects of information 
relevance among fans in Experiment 1 were not replicated in Experiment 2. It is not possible to 
conclude that the effects of information relevance are separate from the effects of outcome valence, at 
least under the 50% reward probability. Therefore, outcome valence in Experiment 2 (i.e, the 
unfavorableness of loss outcomes) was the factor affecting FRN and not information relevance. 
However, this low win probability might have been unrealistic in hockey, which made fans pay less 
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attention to outcome feedback in the relevant condition. As a result, the differences in FRN amplitudes 
between the relevant and irrelevant conditions were reduced compared to Experiment 1.  
 
As for non-fans, they showed no effects of information relevance on FRN in the first block. 
However, they showed the reverse effects of information relevance in the second block, as FRN 
amplitudes were larger in the irrelevant condition compared to the relevant. In Experiment 1, no effects 
of information relevance were observed among non-fans as FRN amplitudes were similar in both 
conditions. The reason for that might have been because non-fans showed higher sensitivity towards 
irrelevant information compared to fans. In Experiment 2, non-fans continued to show even higher 
sensitivity towards irrelevant information compared to fans, especially in the second block. Regardless 
of the reason for this oversensitivity towards irrelevant information, it is apparent that there are 
differences in the way fans and non-fans process irrelevant information. This was unexpected since this 
irrelevant information was not believed to be a predicting factor to the outcomes of games as non-fans 
indicated during interviews.  
 
 The results of Experiment 2 did not provide support to the possible differences in FRN 
amplitudes between fans and non-fans in the relevant condition. These differences were expected since 
fans make their decisions in the relevant information condition based on their long-held expectancy 
about GAA as a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games. On the other hand, non-fans make their 
decisions based on the instructions they were given at the start of the experiment and their learning as 
they perform the task. Results of Experiment 2 showed that fans and non-fans did not show differences 
in FRN amplitudes in the relevant information in either block. As mentioned above, the low reward 
probability in the relevant condition might have been seen as unrealistic by fans and they might have 
paid less attention to outcome feedback as a result. That in turn could have contributed to smaller FRN 
amplitudes in the relevant condition which might have made it difficult to observe the possible 
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differences compared to non-fans. Behavioural data showed an encouraging trend, however. In the first 
block of Experiment 2, fans and non-fans selected the team with the lower GAA with a very similar 
high frequency. In the second block, fans continued to select the team with the lower GAA with a high 
frequency, whereas non-fans trended towards selecting the team with the lower GAA with a lower 
frequency, almost at 50%. This shows that fans were more persistent compared to non-fans in selecting 
the team with the lower GAA despite the low reward probability. This trend shows that fans and non-
fans made their decisions based on different expectancies. Therefore, it is possible that differences in 
FRN amplitudes between fan and fans emerge under different contexts.  
 
As for P300, results of Experiment 1 showed effects of outcome valence on P300, larger 
amplitudes in response to loss trials compared to win trials. But, loss trials were less frequent than win 
trials. As a result, it was unclear whether larger P300 amplitudes in response to loss trials reflected 
outcome valence (i.e, unfavourableness) or the low frequency of loss trials. However, it is a strong 
finding in the literature that P300 amplitudes are larger in response to infrequent stimuli compared to 
frequent stimuli (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, 2011). On the 
other hand, it has been shown that no differences in P300 amplitudes are found in response to different 
stimuli when their frequencies are equal (Campbell et al., 1979; Cheng et al., in preparation). 
Therefore, no effects of outcome valence on P300 amplitudes in response to loss trials compared to win 
trials were expected in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 both fans and non-fans showed no effects of 
outcome valence on P300 as amplitudes were similar in response to loss compared to win trials. 
Therefore, it is likely that the larger P300 amplitudes in response to loss trials in Experiment 1 reflected 
the low frequency of loss trials and not their unfavourableness. According to Donchin and Cole’s 
Context-update hypothesis (1988), larger P300 amplitudes in response to infrequent stimuli help update 
reward representations. This is important in order to respond to the task according to these reward 
 57 
representations and maximize reward (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Johnson & Donchin, 1977; 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011). 
 
Moreover, Experiment 1 showed unexpected effects of information relevance on P300 for both 
fans and non-fans and in the opposite direction. P300 amplitudes were larger in response to loss trials 
in the irrelevant condition compared to the relevant. However, in Experiment 2 results were mixed. 
Fans showed no effects of information relevance in the first block, but lower amplitudes in response to 
loss trials in the relevant condition in the second block compared to the first. This suggests that their 
attention towards irrelevant information was maintained throughout the experiment, but their attention 
towards relevant information decreased by the second block. This provides support to the suspicion that 
fans might have perceived the 50% probability in the relevant condition as unrealistic and paid less 
attention to outcome feedback in the second block. Non-fans showed no effects of information 
relevance in the first block, but in the second block they showed larger P300 amplitudes in response to 
loss trials in both conditions. This increase in attention towards irrlevant information in the second 
block could be the result of irrational cognitive process as a result of the 50% reward probability 
(Ladouceur, 2004; Miller & Currie, 2008). In addition, this increase in attention towards irrlevant 
information in the second block was possibly the reason for the unexpected larger FRN amplitudes in 
the irrelevant condition among non-fans. 
 
 To summarize the relationship between FRN and P300 in light of the results of Experiment 1 
and 2. FRN and P300 seem to respond in a similar manner to outcome valence among both fans and 
non-fans in Experiment 1; larger amplitudes in response to loss trials. FRN and P300 seem to respond 
in a somewhat different manner to outcome valence in Experiment 2; larger FRN amplitudes in 
response to loss trials, while no effects on P300. On the other hand, FRN and P300 seem to respond in 
a different manner to information relevance especially among fans in Experiment 1; larger FRN 
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amplitudes in response to relevant information and larger P300 amplitudes in the irrelevant 
information. Whereas in Experiment 2 FRN and P300 show mixed results, with increase in both FRN 
and P300 amplitudes among non-fans in the irrelevant condition, while fans show decrease in the 
relevant condition. Therefore, the different win probabilities in Experiments 1 and 2 had different 
effects on FRN and P300 among fans and non-fans. The majority of these results were not expected as 
they contradict what was found in Cheng et al. (in preparation) and what was expected based on the 
hypotheses in these two experiments. However, the type of irrelevant information that was used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 could have been the reason for the unexpected results for FRN and P300. This is a 
possibility since Experiments 1 and 2 showed unexpected larger FRN and P300 amplitudes in response 
to irrelevant information in some conditions and equally large FRN amplitudes in response to both 
types of information in some other conditions.  
 
 
                                     Experiment 3 
 
 The main purpose of Experiment 3 was to remove any possible effects of the irrelevant 
condition on FRN in the relevant condition. Specifically, the irrelevant condition could have had a 
carryover effect on the relevant condition due to the probability of winning 50% of the trials. Research 
suggests that experiencing reward at 50% can create a number of irrational cognitive processes in 
gambling games (Ladouceur, 2004; Miller, & Currie, 2008). Irrational cognitive processes could have 
been generated when experiencing reward at chance level in the irrelevant condition. These irrational 
processes then carried over to the relevant condition washing out the expected differences in FRN 
amplitudes between fans and non-fans. This was especially possible among non-fans as they showed 
larger FRN amplitudes in response to irrelevant information compared to fans in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Therefore, Experiment 3 consisted of relevant information only to remove these possible carry over 
effects.  
 
Another purpose of the experiment is to have a better control over the expectancy about GAA 
that fans and non-fans have before the introduction of the strong deviation of 50%, where differences in 
FRN amplitudes are expected to emerge. For non-fans, in Experiment 1 they were not given 
instructions about the nature of GAA as a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games; however, they 
selected the team with low GAA on the vast majority of trials. This is because of their general 
expectancy about statistics as a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games (Wood, 1992; Woodland 
and Woodland, 2001). This expectancy was reinforced by experiencing reward on 75% of the trials 
creating an expectancy about GAA specifically. In Experiment 2, they were given instructions about 
the nature of GAA as a strong factor in predicting outcomes of games, but they did not experience 
frequent reward and therefore might not have created an expectancy about GAA. Debriefing interviews 
with non-fans suggested that by the second block of Experiment 2 they were selecting randomly.  
 
 In Experiment 3, instructions and reinforcement through experiencing a high percentage of 
reward were combined to investigate the expected differences in FRN amplitudes between fans and 
non-fans when they experienced a strong deviation in outcomes from expectancy. To achieve that, the 
first part of Experiment 3 was designed to reinforce both fans and non-fans' expectancy about GAA as 
a strong predictor of outcomes of games by exposing them to a 75% chance of winning a trial when 
they selected the team with the low GAA. To fans, the 75% chance of winning reinforces their long-
held expectancy about GAA, while to non-fans; the 75% chance of winning creates and reinforces an 
expectancy about GAA as a statistic that helps predict the outcomes of games. Thereafter, the strong 
deviation from expectancy is introduced by rewarding the selection of the team with low GAA on only 
50% of trials. This 50% winning probability constitutes a deviation from the long-held expectancy that 
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fans have acquired about GAA over the years; whereas to the non-fans, it is a deviation from an 
expectancy that they have acquired by performing the task.  
 
It was expected that the results of Experiment 1 would be replicated in the first part of this 
experiment, with no differences found in FRN amplitudes between fans and non-fans. A 25% 
probability of a team with low GAA losing to a team with higher GAA is not a strong deviation from 
expectancy to both fans and non-fans. To fans, this 25% probability is somewhat expected, while to 
non-fans, this 25% probability matches the instructions that there given about the GAA stat. Therefore, 
FRN amplitudes were expected to be equally large for loss trials and win trials for both fans and non-
fans when the team with low GAA was selected. On the other hand, FRN amplitudes were expected to 
be larger for fans compared to non-fans in the second part of this experiment where the probability of 
winning a trial was set to 50%. This probability is a strong deviation from fans' expectancy about GAA 
that is created through years of following the game and is stronger than non-fans' expectancy that was 
created through instructions and reinforcement. As for the P300 in the first part of the experiment, it 
was expected that loss trials would elicit larger P300 amplitudes for both fans and non-fans than win 
trials since they were infrequent (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977). In the 
second part, P300 was expected to show a similar trend to Experiment 2, where amplitudes are not 
different for win and loss trials since they were equally frequent (Campbell et al., 1979).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                        Method 
 
Apparatus.  
The apparatus was identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Participants.  
Forty-one right-handed Wilfrid Laurier University undergraduate students (24 females) participated for 
class credits through PREP. Participants' ages ranged between 18-23 ( M = 19.1, SD = 1.82), with 21 
fans and 20 non-fans. Data from two participants were excluded due to excessive EEG artifacts, 
resulting in data from 39 participants to be included in the analysis (23 females, M = 19.2, SD = 1.83), 
with 21 hockey fans and 19 non-fans. All participants signed a consent form explaining the type of data 
recording that is used in experiment, potential risks, and other related issues as required by the 
Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. 
 
Procedure and Design.  
Those were similar to Experiments 1 and 2, except for the following changes. First, the two blocks of 
irrelevant information in Experiments 1 and 2 were replaced with two blocks of relevant information 
(see Figure 1A), resulting in a total of 400 trials of relevant information. Due to this manipulation, each 
of the 200 unique trials that were used once in Experiments 1 and 2 were used twice in Experiment 3. 
This was done by randomly allocating the trials among the 4 blocks by using an online randomizer 
(http://www.randomizer.org) in a way that a trial was never repeated within the same block, and each 
trial was repeated only twice throughout the experiment. The second change in Experiment 3 was the 
manipulation of the winning probabilities between the first and the second part of the experiment. The 
winning probability in the first two blocks (first part) was set to 75% if participants selected the team 
with the lower GAA on each trial. While in the last two blocks (second part), the winning probability 
was set to 50% if participants selected the team with the lower GAA on each trial. Participants were not 
told about the winning probabilities and that the trials were actual NHL hockey games that were 
selected at random. Participants were also not told that there were two parts to the experiment, and they 
were given the same instructions as in Experiment 2 (see Appendix C). 
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ERP recording and analysis.  
The recording and analysis was similar to Experiments 1 and 2, except for the exclusion of the 
outcomes that are related to the irrelevant information condition. Therefore, grand amplitude averages 
for four outcomes in each part of the experiment were created: select low GAA and win (low_win), 
select low GAA and lose (low_lose), select high GAA and win (high_win), and select high GAA and 
lose (high_lose). Since participants rarely selected the teams with the high GAA, final analysis 
included the two outcomes of (low_lose) and (low_win) in each part. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, 
the number of trials in each outcome of (low_lose) and (low_win) in both parts was down-sampled to 
the number of trials in the outcome with the least number of trials across the two parts. 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
The extracted peak amplitudes for FRN were subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA using SPSS 
(version 19.1, IBM Corp.), with hockey expertise (fan vs. non-fan) as the between-subjects factor, and 
part of the experiment (part 1 vs. part 2) and outcome (wins vs. losses) as the within-subjects factors. 
The extracted P300 amplitudes were also subjected to the same type of analysis using the same factors 
as in the FRN analysis.                                             
 
                                               Results 
                                                                         
 
Behavioural results.  
Fans in the first part of the experiment selected the team with the lower GAA on 95% of trials, while in the 
second part they selected the team with the lower GAA on 93% of trials. On the other hand, non-fans in the 
first part of the experiment selected the team with the lower GAA on 94% of trials, while in the second part 
they selected the team with the lower GAA on 89% of trials. Also, see Table 3 for the average number of 
accepted trials before and after down sampling. 
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Condition  Average number of accepted trials 
after down sampling 
Average number of accepted trials 
before down sampling 
Low-Win (Part1)(Part2) (37.8)(37.8) (113.8)(65) 
Low-Loss (Part1)(Part2) (37.8)(37.8) (37.8)(61.1) 
 
 Figure 18: Number of accepted trials before and after downsampling in Experiment 3 
 
FRN Amplitudes.  
A 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Outcome: wins vs. Losses) X 2 (Block: block 1 vs. bock2) RM-
ANOVA yielded a main effect of outcome F (1,37)= 16.58, p < .0001, indicating that loss trials elicit larger 
FRN amplitudes (M= -.401, SD= .474) compared to win trials (M= 1.393, SD= .470). The ANOVA also 
yielded a main of block F (1,37)= 19.9, p < .000, indicating that trials in the first part of the experiment 
elicited larger FRN amplitudes (M= -.111, SD= .435) compared to trials in the second part (M= 1.102, SD= 
.443). Interaction between outcome and block did not reach significance F (1,37) =.229, p = .635. (See 
Figures 19, 20 & 21).  
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 Figure 19: FRN average amplitudes in Experiment 3  
Bars represent the standard error. 
 
                            
Figure 20: FRN average waveforms for losses in Experiment 3 
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Figure 21: FRN waverforms for wins in Experiment 3 
   
 
P300 Amplitudes.  
A 2 (Group: fans vs. Non-fans) X 2 (Outcome: Wins vs. Losses) X 2 (Block: block 1 vs. block2) RM-
ANOVA yielded a main effect of outcome F (1,37)= 14.772, p < .000, indicating that loss trials elicited 
larger P300 amplitudes (M= 7.718, SD= .601) than win trials (M= 5.187, SD= .475). Contrary to what was 
expected, a main effect of block did not reach significance F (1,37) = .737, p = .396. (See Figures 22,23 & 
24) 
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 Figure 22: P300 average amplitudes in Experiment 3  
Bars represent the standard error. 
 
   
 
Figure 23: P300 average waveforms for part1 of Experiment 3 
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Figure 24: P300 average waveforms for part 2 of Experiment 3 
 
                                               Discussion 
 
 
Experiment 3 was designed to further investigate the expected differences in FRN in response 
to a deviation from a long-held expectancy in fans compared to a deviation from an expectancy that is 
developed by performing the task in non-fans. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed trends 
suggesting that the type of irrelevant information that was used might have had unwanted effects on the 
relevant condition. Therefore, Experiment 3 excluded the irrelevant information condition to remove 
these possible effects. In addition, Experiment 3 addressed the issue of lack of control over the 
expectancies about GAA that fans and non-fans based their decisions on in Experiments 1 and 2. In 
Experiment 1, non-fans were not given instructions about GAA, but they experienced high reward of 
75% and selected the team with the lower GAA on the majority of trials. In Experiment 2, non-fans 
were given instructions about GAA, but they did not experience high reward and trended towards 
selecting the team with the lower GAA less frequently than fans. Therefore, in the first part of 
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Experiment 3 both groups were given instructions about GAA and had their expectancy about GAA 
reinforced by experiencing a 75% win probability when the team with the lower GAA was selected. 
Thereafter, both groups experienced a strong deviation from expectancy at 50% win probability and at 
this win probability; differences in FRN were expected to emerge.  
 
FRN results showed: first, effects of outcome valence on FRN for both fans and non-fans, 
larger amplitudes in response to loss compared to win trials. These effects were observed under the 
75% reward probability in the first part and under the 50% reward probability in the second part. 
Second, no differences between fans and non-fans in either part, FRN amplitudes were similar in 
response to loss trials when the team with the lower GAA was selected. Third, FRN amplitudes were 
larger in the first part of the experiment compared to the second for both fans and non-fans. 
 
Both fans and non-fans showed effects of outcome valence on FRN as amplitudes were larger 
in response to loss trials compared to win trials in both parts of the experiment. These effects were 
observed independently of the reward probability. Loss trials elicited larger FRN amplitudes where the 
reward probability was at 75% in the first part of the experiment and in the second part where the 
reward probability was at 50%. Moreover, these effects were also observed despite the overall lower 
FRN amplitudes in the second part of the experimental session. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, effects 
of outcome valence on FRN seem to be robust regardless of reward probability. Regardless of the 
experimental circumstances, loss trials are unfavourable outcomes and elicit larger FRN amplitudes 
(Cheng et al., in preparation; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 
1997). Oliveira et al (2007) argued that loss trials always elicit larger FRN amplitudes since loss trials 
also deviate from participants’ expectancy of winning. They showed that larger FRN amplitudes can 
also be elicited in response to win trials that deviate from participants’ expectancy when participants 
expected a loss and received a win instead. However, it was not possible to test whether FRN reflects 
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deviation from expectancy regardless of the valence of outcomes in Experiment 3 since participants 
rarely selected the team with the higher GAA. 
 
Results of Experiment 3 did not show differences in FRN between fans and non-fans in either 
the first or second part of the experimental session. Both fans and non-fans had the expectancy of 
receiving a win when the team with the lower GAA was selected to beat the team with the considerably 
higher GAA. Fans have this long-held expectancy as a result of following the game of hockey for years 
and experiencing such results. On the other hand, non-fans have a general bias that statistical 
information is a strong predictor of outcomes of games (Wood, 1992; Woodland & Woodland, 2001). 
They also developed an expectancy about GAA as they received instructions about GAA prior to the 
experiment and experienced high reward in the first part. Therefore, it was expected that when the team 
with the lower GAA was selected and the result was a loss, larger FRN amplitudes would be observed 
as a reflection that this outcome deviated from both fans and non-fans’ expectancies. However, based 
on the results of Experiment 1, no differences were expected in FRN amplitudes between fans and non-
fans in response to a loss trial in the first part of Experiment 3. That is because fans indicated that a 
25% chance of a team with lower GAA losing to a team with higher GAA is somewhat expected in the 
game of hockey. At the same time, instructions in Experiment 3 stated that in the game of hockey the 
team with lower GAA is not expected to beat the team with the considerably higher GAA every time, 
but is likely to do so. Therefore, both fans and non-fans had expectancies that a 25% probability of 
receiving a loss trial when selecting the team with the lower GAA is likely. The results showed no 
differences between fans and non-fans in FRN amplitudes when the team with the lower GAA was 
selected and a loss trial was the outcome.  
 
 Both fans and non-fans showed similar FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials when the team 
with the lower GAA was selected in the second part compared to the first part. In fact, both fans and 
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non-fans showed even smaller FRN amplitudes in the second part of the experiment compared to the 
first. The differences in FRN between fans and non-fans were expected to emerge in the second part of 
the experiment. The 50% probability of receiving a win when the team with the lower GAA was 
selected is a strong deviation from the expectancies that both fans and non-fans hold about GAA. 
However, it was expected to elicit larger FRN amplitudes among fans compared to non-fans since it 
was a deviation from a long-held expectancy compared to a deviation from an expectancy that was 
developed by non-fans as they performed the first part of the experiment. Results of Experiment 3 did 
not provide support to this hypothesis.  
 
However, it has been suggested that when individuals learn a representation, the reliance on 
external feedback is reduced and FRN is reduced as a result (Van Meel & Van Heijningen, 2010). 
Behavioural data provide some support to this explanation, as both fans and non-fans continued to 
select the team with the lower GAA on the majority of trials in the second part despite winning on only 
50% of trials. This suggests that both fans and non-fans were basing their decisions on the expectancy 
that lower GAA is the correct choice in the second part and they might have relied less on outcome 
feedback. P300 results provide some support to this explanation, as both fans and non-fans showed 
larger P300 amplitudes in response to loss compared to win trials in the first part of the experiment as 
was expected since loss trials were infrequent. However, and contrary to what was expected, they 
continued to show larger P300 amplitudes in response to loss trials in the second part despite the fact 
that loss and win and loss trials were equally frequent. This suggests that both fans and non-fans were 
still operating by the reward probability that was reinforced in the first part, and perhaps failed to detect 
the change in reward probability in the second part. Less attention towards feedback makes it harder to 
detect the possible differences in FRN between fans and non-fans.  
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 As for P300, the first part of Experiment 3 yielded the expected effects of outcome probability. 
P300 amplitudes were larger in response to loss trials compared to win trials for both fans and non-
fans. This was expected since loss trials were the infrequent stimuli compared to win trials (Donchin & 
Coles, 1988; Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, 2011). These results replicate those in 
Experiment 1, where the winning probability was set to 75% as well. According to the context-update 
hypothesis by Donchin and Cole, (1988) larger P300 amplitudes in response to infrequent stimuli 
represent increased attentional resources towards these stimuli in order to create internal 
representations about the reward probability, adapt to the reward probabilities and maximize reward. 
Both fans and non-fans in the first part of the experiment allocated greater attention towards loss trials 
as they were the infrequent stimuli in order to create a representation that winning is the more frequent 
outcome when the team with the lower GAA was selected.  
 
However, results in the second part of the experiment, where the winning probability was set to 
50%, did not yield the expected results. P300 amplitudes were expected not to show effects of outcome 
valence as win and loss trials were of equal frequency (Campbell et al, 1979). P300 amplitudes were 
still larger in response to loss trials compared to win trials for both fans and non-fans. As mentioned 
earlier, these larger P300 amplitudes in response to loss trials suggest that both fans and non-fans were 
allocating greater attention towards loss trials despite the fact that they were as frequent as win trials. 
Therefore under the circumstances of Experiment 3, FRN and P300 show a similar pattern in response 
to outcome valence in both parts of the experiment for both fans non-fans; larger amplitudes in 
response to loss trials compared to win trials.   
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                                     Limitations 
 
 There are a few possible explanations for why no differences in the FRN amplitudes were found 
between fans and non-fans in response to relevant information were not supported. First, it is possible 
that the GAA statistic was simple to learn. The GAA statistic represents the average number of goals a 
team allows into their net and the lower the GAA a team has, the less goals they allow and the higher 
the likelihood of winning games. This characteristic of the lower the statistic the higher the likelihood 
of winning is found in a number of popular sports that most individuals have exposure to. For example, 
in soccer the lower the average number of goals a team allows, the higher the chance it has of winning 
and in baseball the lower the average number of runs a pitcher allows the higher the likelihood of that 
pitcher winning the game. Therefore, the concept behind the GAA statistic might have not been foreign 
to non-fans and that could have possibly made it easy for them to apply this concept to the GAA and 
adapt to the task. This quick learning among non-fans could have affected the FRN in response to loss 
trials and the failure to observe differences between fans and non-fans as a result. This is especially a 
challenge since it is difficult to measure FRN and investigate possible differences over the first a few 
trials within an experimental block where FRN amplitudes might show the highest differences between 
fans and non-fans.  
 
 Another possible limitation is the 50% probability of receiving a win when the team with the 
lower GAA was selected might have been unrealistic. In Experiments 2 and 3 the 50% probability was 
meant to serve as a strong deviation from fans' expectancy about GAA and differences in FRN 
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amplitudes between fans and non-fans were expected to be observed. However, this low probability 
might have been unrealistic and did not reflect what GAA normally predicts in hockey. As a result, 
fans might have paid less attention to outcome feedback and FRN amplitudes might have not reflected 
the true response to outcomes that deviate from expectancy. Future research can use win probabilities 
that represent a strong deviation from fan's expectancy, yet still realistic and do not deter fans from 
paying attention to outcome feedback. Future research can also experiment with alternating between 
the 75% and 50% win probabilities if necessary. Since the 75% probability seems to be realistic to fans, 
future research can alternate between the two probabilities to prevent fans from paying less attention to 
the 50% probability. As a result, larger FRN amplitudes in response to deviation from expectancy 
might emerge in the 50% probability condition among fans compared to non-fans.       
                                                    
 
                               General Discussion  
 
    This thesis aimed to first find consistency with the general observation that FRN amplitudes are 
larger in response to loss outcome compared to win (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). The second aim of the study was to replicate the effect of 
information relevance on FRN that was found in Cheng et al. (in preparation). Cheng et al. found that a 
violation of expectancy involving relevant information elicited larger FRN amplitudes compared to 
irrelevant information. The third and more important aim of this study was to investigate whether 
hockey fans would show larger FRN amplitudes in response to a violation of expectancy with relevant 
information that is related to hockey compared to non-fans. Fans were expected to show larger FRN 
amplitudes when they select the team with the lower GAA to win a game and the outcome is a loss 
compared to non-fans. Fans were expected to show larger FRN because of their long-term knowledge 
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about the game of hockey compared to non-fans who learned about GAA by performing the task. Some 
studies suggest that experts perceive and process information related to their domain of expertise 
differently than novices (Fattahi et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2013). To our knowledge, there has not been 
a study that investigates the differences in FRN between experts and novices. If differences do exist, 
then that would suggest that the level of experience or knowledge adds another factor that modulates 
FRN.  
This study included three experiments that differed in the probability of winning a trial when 
the team with the lower GAA was selected. Experiment 1 had a 75% win probability with relevant and 
irrelevant information, Experiment 2 had a 50% win probability with both relevant and irrelevant and 
Experiment 3 had a 75% in the first part, 50% in the second part and relevant information only. All 
three experiments demonstrated the valance effect on FRN, larger FRN amplitudes for loss trials 
compared to win for both fans and non-fans. This is consistent with the literature that the FRN signals 
unfavourable outcomes (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et 
al., 1997). The effect of information relevance was expected to be found in Experiments 1 and 2 for 
both fans and non-fans. Despite the lack of knowledge among non-fans about GAA, statistical 
information was expected to have more relevance attached to it and larger FRN amplitudes in response 
to a loss were expected in the relevant condition. However, the effect of information relevance was 
found only among fans in Experiment 1, larger FRN amplitudes in the relevant condition compared to 
the irrelevant. This suggests that at least among fans and under a high win probability of 75% a loss 
when the lower GAA was selected is a bigger surprise than a loss in the irrelevant condition. As for the 
main hypothesis of larger FRN amplitudes for fans compared to non-fans, results trended in the 
predicted direction in all three experiments, but no support was found. Limitations in the current study 
were discussed above and future studies can investigate the differences in FRN between fans and non-
fans by addressing those limitations.  
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 However, there was an unexpected finding in this thesis that might provide future directions and 
add to the literature of FRN and decision making. The unexpected finding was that non-fans showed 
larger FRN amplitudes in response to loss trials in the irrelevant condition compared to fans. This 
finding was unexpected given that team names in the irrelevant condition were unknown to both fans 
and non-fans and which team won the trial was programmed at random. However, non-fans indicated 
that they tried to find patterns in the irrelevant condition to base their decisions on, while fans did not 
seem to try to base their decisions on any patterns. This finding could imply that since non-fans 
perceive themselves as non-experts in hockey; they might try to treat irrelevant information as a 
predictor of outcomes of games. Sports betting involves a number of information that is irrelevant in 
predicting outcomes of games that could affect response to outcomes among individuals who are or 
perceive themselves as non-experts. For example, horseracing tickets include information that can be 
used to predict horses’ performance (i.e. lifetime winning percentage) and other information that is not 
predictive (i.e. horse coat color or the name of the horse). Future research can investigate the possible 
effects of irrelevant information on the way relevant information is processed among novice 
individuals and the overall effects on decision making.       
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